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Abstract
This article deals with the impact of intermediaries on insurance market
transparency and performance. In a market exhibiting product diﬀeren-
tiation and coexistence of perfectly and imperfectly informed consumers,
competition among insurers leads to non-existence of a pure-strategy mar-
ket equilibrium. Consumers may become informed about product suit-
ability by consulting an intermediary. We explicitly model two interme-
diary remuneration systems: commissions and fees. We ﬁnd that social
welfare under fees is ﬁrst-best eﬃcient but fees lead to lower expected
proﬁts of insurers and non-existence of a pure-strategy market equilib-
rium. Commissions, in contrast, cause ’overinformation’ of consumers
relative to minimal social cost, but yield a full-information equilibrium in
pure strategies associated with higher expected proﬁts of insurers. This
might explain why intermediaries are generally compensated by insurers.
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11 Introduction
Despite many potential sources of information about insurance products avail-
able today – like the internet, ﬁnancial magazines, informative advertising or
simply word-of-mouth information – a fraction of consumers looking for in-
surance coverage is often not well-informed about the insurance product or
provider which best suits their individual preferences. A reason for this phe-
nomenon might be that information is sometimes not easy or too costly to obtain
or simply that some consumers do not trust in information publicly available.
This paper considers a duopolistic insurance market with product diﬀerentiation
where some consumers are uninformed about product ’ﬁt’.
Common economic models of insurance markets often consider either a monop-
olistic insurer or a perfectly competitive insurance market. These contrarian
analyses are due to two implicit assumptions. The ﬁrst assumption is that in-
surance is a homogeneous good. The second is that any insurer can potentially
serve the whole market demand. Given these assumptions, if an insurer of-
fers a marginally smaller price than its competitors, it gains (and serves) the
whole market demand. Therefore, if at least two insurers compete in premiums,
Bertrand competition yields zero proﬁts and the premium to the insureds is
actuarially fair. This is the so called Bertrand Paradox.1,2
The Bertrand Paradox seems to be one reason to explain that while monopolistic
and competitive insurance markets are subject to vast research in insurance eco-
nomics, very few theoretical work examines the intermediate case of oligopolistic
insurers sustaining positive proﬁts in equilibrium. Polborn [1998] considers an
insurance oligopoly with two risk-averse insurers engaged in Bertrand compe-
tition. The insurers face a trade-oﬀ between proﬁt and risk, so that in equi-
librium premiums tend to exceed marginal cost. Schlesinger and Schulenburg
[1991] study oligopolistic competition of insurers in a product diﬀerentiation
framework exhibiting search and switching costs. They show that introducing
search and switching costs of insureds provides some market power to incumbent
insurers and reduces market shares to new entrants.
1 The Bertrand Paradox is named after Bertrand [1883] who argued that if duopolistic
ﬁrms compete via price, the noncooperative equilibrium price would fall to marginal cost
since the ﬁrms would keep undercutting each other. See Bertrand [1883].
2 Sonnenholzner and Wambach [2003] argue that Bertrand competition seems indeed to be
a plausible mechanism in insurance markets since competition takes place via premiums
due to the fact that insurers cannot produce coverage in advance.
2In contrast to the small theoretical literature on insurance oligopolies, empirical
evidence suggests that insurance markets are rather oligopolistic than perfectly
competitive.3 It is widely known that insurance providers tend to make positive
proﬁts.4 It seems thus interesting to develop a theoretical model of an oligopolis-
tic insurance market where insurers actually make proﬁts in equilibrium. We
contribute to ﬁll this gap and suggest a solution to the Bertrand Paradox.
Most insurance models interpret an ’insurance contract’ as a pair of only two
parameters, the insurance premium paid by the insured regardless of state and
the indemniﬁcation payment paid by the insurer in case of loss. As pointed out
by Schlesinger and Schulenburg [1991], in reality such an insurance contract is
rather a long description of contingencies in which the contract pays out and
in which it does not. One should make a reasonable distinction between the
”insurance contract” and the ”insurance product”. The insurance product rep-
resents a service that may diﬀer from other services. The actual ”ﬁt” of the
product to the needs of a consumer therefore also diﬀers. The service may in-
clude claims settlement and risk management services, the availability of local
agents or method-of-payment options. Warranties and embedded options in life
insurance are also a means by which insurance products may be diﬀerentiated.
We may consider life insurance policies with the same premium but diﬀerent
maturities or embedded options. Product characteristics diﬀer between insur-
ers, even though insurance contracts seem to be identical.5 For Germany, for
instance, empirical evidence of perceived product heterogeneity in insurance
markets is found by Schlesinger and Schulenburg [1993].
Taking these arguments into account, insurance is a rather sophisticated and
multidimensional product about which characteristics consumers are often poorly
informed. Although consumers might be well-informed about existence and
prices of insurance products (and maybe even some attributes diﬀerentiating
them), information about which product is actually best suited for them is not
easy to obtain. Consumers may observe prices and product characteristics of
3 See, for instance, Nissan and Caveny [2001] and Murat et al. [2002]. Murat et al.
[2002] also ﬁnd that their evidence is consistent with a trade-oﬀ between competition and
industry stability. See Murat et al. [2002], p. 477. Interestingly, our ﬁndings suggest
that more intense competition (due to existence of imperfectly informed consumers in
the market) makes the market less stable.
4 According to the Insurance Information Institute, for instance, property-casualty insurers
in the US earned net income after taxes of about 44 billion dollars in 2005 and 64 billion
dollars in 2006.
5 See Schlesinger and Schulenburg [1991], p. 110.
3existing insurance products but they may not easily determine their best match-
ing product due to lack of information. Our framework highlights this lack of
information and aims at explaining the existence of intermediaries in insurance
markets. An intermediary plays a matchmaking role of ’market maker’ in rec-
ommending the appropriate insurance product, i.e. in matching buyers with ap-
propriate insurance providers.6 Thus ’uninformed’ consumers can be informed
about their best matching insurance product by consulting a broker. Therefore,
in our model the role of brokers is to provide information about optimal product
match. This information, however, comes at a cost. We analyze two remuner-
ation systems: commissions and fees. We show that fees lead to higher social
welfare than commissions but imply lower expected proﬁts of insurance providers
and non-existence of a pure-strategy market equilibrium. Commissions, in con-
trast, cause ’overinformation’ of consumers relative to minimal social cost, but
yield a full-information market equilibrium in pure strategies.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a short literature
review. Section 3 introduces our model in a Hotelling framework. As a point of
reference, we ﬁrst study a diﬀerentiated insurance market without intermedia-
tion in section 4 and show that no equilibrium exists in pure strategies. Section
5 introduces intermediation. We show that intermediation may lead to a pure
strategy full-information equilibrium under commissions, but not under fees.
We also analyze social welfare under both remuneration systems. Conclusions
are summarized in the ﬁnal section.
2 Related Literature
Previous research on eﬃciency of intermediation addresses several functions in-
termediaries might generally fulﬁll in markets exhibiting imperfect information.
For instance, Biglaiser [1993] presents a basic bargaining framework where mid-
dlemen might reduce ineﬃciencies that arise from adverse selection problems.
Brokers as search agents whose function is to match trading partners are studied
by Rubinstein and Wolinsky [1987], Posey and Yavas [1995], Cosimano [1996],
Posey and Tennyson [1998] as well as Seog [1999]. Rubinstein and Wolinsky
[1987] present a general framework where time-consuming negotiations between
buyers, sellers and middlemen take place. Cosimano [1996] introduces a monop-
olist intermediary who lowers the probability of an unsuccessful trade among
6 See Cummins and Doherty [2006], p. 393.
4buyers and sellers. More speciﬁcally, Posey and Yavas [1995] and Posey and
Tennyson [1998] refer to insurance markets. They oﬀer search models where in-
surers and consumers may engage in costly search for matching partners. Both
insurers and consumers can be of either high or low search cost type. Insurers
may transfer the search task to brokers. Brokers then fulﬁll a search function by
looking for potential customers at a commission fee to be paid by the insurer.
Seog [1999] examines an insurance market where consumers are poorly informed
about the price distribution and focuses on dynamic aspects of price search by
intermediaries in order to ﬁnd a long-run equilibrium where dependent and in-
dependent brokers might coexist. Cummins and Doherty [2006] argue that in
an insurance market where insurers cannot observe loss probabilities but do
know overall average loss probability, brokers might prevent a market failure
due to adverse selection by informing insurers about loss probabilities of their
customers.
In insurance markets, the brokers’ most important function can be seen in a
matchmaking function.7 Gravelle [1994] oﬀers a model for a competitive insur-
ance market with intermediation.8 He assumes that the brokers’ function lies
in determining the best-matching insurance product for consumers. Insurers
oﬀer only one type of insurance product and engage in Bertrand competition
via brokers. Consumers are heterogeneous in their preferences for the insur-
ance product and uninformed about whether the product actually oﬀers a good
match with their individual preferences. They know the overall distribution
of mismatch in society and the expected mismatch but are unable to deter-
mine their individual degree of mismatch from buying the insurance product.
A broker can inform a consumer about his individual degree of mismatch. In
competitive equilibrium marginal cost pricing and thus zero proﬁts of insurers
result. This is true under both the commission system and the fee-for-advice
system. Hence, both systems appear equivalent from a proﬁtability viewpoint of
insurers. Gravelle also ﬁnds that neither fees nor commissions might achieve an
even second-best eﬃcient equilibrium solution in his framework. Unlike Grav-
elle, we look at an oligopolistic insurance market with diﬀerentiated products
7 Although there may be other functions of intermediaries in insurance markets, such as
providing risk management consulting, loss mitigation or assistance with claims settle-
ment, the matchmaking role actually seems to be the most important.
8 Gravelle [1994] builds upon similar papers he wrote in 1991 and 1993. Gravelle [1991,
1993] studies the implications of the commission system with regard to advice quality
provided by brokers in a life insurance market.
5where insurance providers may interact strategically.
Focht et al. [2006] build upon a product diﬀerentiation framework by Schultz
[2004]. There are some uninformed consumers who can neither observe prices
nor product varieties in the market. The authors show that a pure-strategy
equilibrium might exist given that all consumers have rational and identical
expectations about prices and product characteristics. Without intermediation,
equilibrium proﬁts of insurance providers are higher compared to proﬁts given
intermediation. Furthermore, equilibrium proﬁts under commissions and fees
are equivalent. Hence, from the insurers’ viewpoint, intermediation is associated
with lower proﬁts (but higher social welfare). We diﬀer from this view. In our
framework prices are observable by all consumers in the insurance market. The
rationale underlying this assumption is that unobservability of prices seems
not very common, since price information is actually quite easy to obtain (for
instance via the internet) while information about individual product match is
less easily determined. We will see that this diﬀerent and perhaps more realistic
information structure leads to completely opposite results.
3 The Model
Our model follows the well-known product diﬀerentiation approach by Hotelling
[1929] who formulated the following model of location and price choice in duopoly:
Consumers are uniformly distributed on the unit line. A single good is produced
at zero cost by two ﬁrms, each of which selects a location in the unit line and
a price. Consumers have travel cost proportional to the distance to ﬁrms, and
buy one unit of the good from the ﬁrm for which price plus travel cost is lowest.
The model is a two-stage game between the two ﬁrms. In the ﬁst stage each ﬁrm
(simultaneously) selects a location on the unit line, in the second stage, having
observed the locations selected, each ﬁrm (simultaneously) oﬀers a price.9 The
Hotelling model has been discussed in diﬀerent contexts by many authors.10
Consider an insurance market with a continuum of consumers. The number
of consumers in the market is normalized to one. Consumers are uniformly
distributed on a line of unit length. There are two insurers in the market,
9 The Hotelling model is a model of horizontal product diﬀerentiation. For a detailed
discussion of horizontal product diﬀerentiation models, see Martin [2002], pp. 84-105.
10 Our setting follows d’Aspremont et al. [1979].
6i ∈ {1,2}, oﬀering each some variant of the insurance product.11 Insurers are
located at the extreme points of the unit line: Provider 1 is located at 0 and
provider 2 at 1.12 The position of a consumer on the Hotelling line represents his
individual preferences for the insurance product oﬀered. A consumer located at
x ∈ (0,1) cannot have a perfectly matching product, so there is some disutility
(called transport cost) involved in purchasing this product.
We make the following basic assumptions concerning the distribution of infor-
mation in the insurance market: All consumers can observe prices of all existing
insurance products, but some consumers cannot observe product varieties in
order to determine which insurance product actually oﬀers the best match for
their type.13 We will refer to these consumers as ’uninformed’ because, techni-
cally, they do not know their position on the Hotelling line.14 In particular, we
assume that only a fraction δ ∈ (0,1) of consumers is able to determine the best
matching insurance product to their type. The uninformed consumers, how-
ever, following the ’principle of insuﬃcient reason’, have rational expectations
of being in the middle of the market and thus tend to purchase insurance at
the cheapest provider.15 Both types of consumers are uniformly distributed on
locations. This is common knowledge.
We assume that all consumers are risk-averse. Consumers diﬀer in expected
loss and in their preferences for insurance products. Thus, individual suitability
11 Our results generalize to the case of N ﬁrms in an insurance market. Maintaining the
symmetric variety pattern of the Hotelling duopoly market, the N ﬁrm case can be ana-
lyzed in a circular street market as in Salop [1979] where product varieties are symmetric.
See Polo [1991], p. 712.
12 This simpliﬁcation of ’maximal diﬀerentiation’ represents no restriction to our analysis
as is shown in the appendix. The assumption only serves to simplify our exposition.
13 Alternatively, we might assume that all consumers observe prices and varieties, but some
consumers are unable to process this information in order to ﬁnd their best matching
insurance product.
14 Since those consumers do have information about insurance premiums, they are in fact
”partially informed” consumers. However, for simplicity we refer to them as ”unin-
formed” since they diﬀer from the other group in that they do not know their position
on the Hotelling line and thus cannot determine optimal product match.
15 The ’principle of insuﬃcient reason’ was ﬁrst expressed by Jacob Bernoulli. It states that
if an agent is ignorant of the ways an event might occur (and therefore has no reason
to believe that one way will occur rather than another), the event will occur equally
likely. Keynes referred to the principle as the ’principle of indiﬀerence’, formulating it
as ”if there is no known reason for predicating of our subject one rather than another
of several alternatives, then relatively to such knowledge the assertions of each of these
alternatives have an equal probability.” See Keynes [1921], pp. 52-53.
7of insurance products to consumers also diﬀers. Insurers oﬀer premiums Pi =
EX +pi, where EX is expected loss of the policy and pi represents the loading.
Since premiums are marginally fair, i.e. include a ﬁxed loading fee, full insurance
is optimal for consumers as long as the cost of insurance net of expected loss
(i.e. the sum of premium loading and individual disutility of mismatch) does
not exceed their individual risk premium r.16 The amount paid by policyholders
above actuarial cost is the price of insurance. Hence, we refer to pi as the price
for an insurance product of provider i. We assume there is no moral hazard
problem, i.e. expected loss is veriﬁable and contractible by the insurer.
We might introduce a zero stage into the game where insurers ﬁrst simultane-
ously compete in locations (i.e. product characteristics) on the Hotelling-line
before competing in prices. We do not explicitly consider this stage. Locations
of insurers are not very interesting from our point of view since we are mainly
interested in gaining insight into the performance of broker remuneration sys-
tems. Note, however, that for δ = 1, it is easy to show that insurance providers
choose their locations 0 and 1, respectively.17
4 Insurance Market without Intermediation
Given some positive transport cost t > 0, a consumer located at x ∈ [0,1] faces
disutility tx2 (t(1 − x)2) from purchasing an insurance product from insurer 1
(2).18,19 Consumers are suﬃciently risk-averse so that the market is completely
16 Expected loss plus risk premium may be interpreted as the individual willingness to pay
for full risk reduction of a consumer. See the seminal articles by Pratt [1964], Arrow
[1963], Mossin [1968], Smith 1968] or Doherty [1975].
17 D’Aspremont et al. [1979] have shown that if all consumers are informed about product
characteristics and ﬁrms are restricted to locate in [0,1], ﬁrms will locate in 0 and 1,
respectively. In the same way, we may derive optimal product characteristics for insurers
in our framework. Since our focus is on an equilibrium in prices (second stage of the
original Hotelling game), we suppose locations 0 and 1 in the following. This is without
any loss of generality as we show in the appendix.
18 The heterogeneity parameter t represents the marginal disutility of mismatch and thus
measures the intensity of product diﬀerentiation. This disutility is often referred to as
”transportation cost”. In our setting, however, we refer to it as disutility to emphasize
the utility loss from purchasing a product which does not perfectly match a consumer’s
type.
19 We do not treat transportation cost as linear in distance, as we interpret it as a proxy
for disutility from purchasing an insurance product other than the individually most pre-
ferred one. Thus, it seems plausible that unit disutility rises more than proportionately
8covered. A consumer purchases insurance from provider 1 if his net utility is
higher, i.e.20
r − (p1 + tx
2) ≥ r − (p2 + t(1 − x)
2) ⇔ x ≤
p2 − p1 + t
2t
, (1)
where p1 + tx2 (p2 + t(1 − x)2) represent the total cost of purchase for a x-
type consumer when purchasing from provider 1(2). A consumer is indiﬀerent
between purchasing from provider 1 or 2 if he is located at21
b x =
p2 − p1 + t
2t
. (2)
We assume that only a fraction δ of consumers is aware of the ”ﬁt” of insurance
products to their type. Uninformed consumers, represented by (1 − δ), mini-
mize expected cost of purchase by choosing the cheapest provider (since both
product varieties are equally likely to be associated with each price). Hence,
for uninformed consumers, we have classic Bertrand competition. The fraction
δ of informed consumers might be interpreted as a measure of market trans-
parency: the higher δ, the more transparent is the insurance market.22 The
market demand of insurer 1 is therefore given by
D1(p1,p2,δ) = δ(
p2 − p1 + t
2t














with distance. Given linear transportation costs, the so called ”principle of maximum
diﬀerentiation” (i.e. ﬁrms locate as far from each other as possible in equilibrium of
a two-stage game) is replaced by the ”principle of minimum diﬀerentiation”. See, for
instance, Martin [2002], p. 99. However, one should not expect minimum diﬀerentiation
as advocated by Hotelling. This is because the price subgame in Hotelling’s model fails
to have a pure strategy equilibrium if ﬁrms are located ”too close” to each other (but
not at the same point). Correcting the non-existence problem in Hotelling’s original
model, d’Aspremont et al. [1979] verify that with quadratic transportation costs a price
equilibrium exists for all possible locations.
20 Note that the individual risk premium r can diﬀer among consumers. We only assume
that all consumers are suﬃciently risk-averse in order to ask for insurance coverage:
inf r > sup
x∈[0,1]
(p1 + tx2,p2 + t(1 − x)2). See also footnote 25.
21 Throughout the analysis, we assume that b x is positive, i.e. t is suﬃciently high to ensure
non-negative demand.
22 See Schultz [2004], p. 175.
9and demand for insurer 2 is then
D2(p1,p2,δ) = δ(1 −
p2 − p1 + t
2t














Given the market shares of providers 1 and 2, expected proﬁts are
Π1(p1,p2,δ) = p1 · D1(p1,p2,δ) (5)
Π2(p1,p2,δ) = p2 · D2(p1,p2,δ). (6)
Intuition suggests that the price game has no (Bertrand-Nash-) equilibrium in
pure strategies. This seems intuitively clear since the presence of uninformed
consumers provides the insurers with an incentive to slightly undercut the rival
in order to capture all uninformed consumers without losing informed ones.
Undercutting seems worthwhile as long as the premium is not ”too low”. Then,
it may be proﬁtable for an insurer to become a ’niche player’ and set a high
premium supplying informed consumers only, which, again, makes undercutting
worthwhile for the rival insurer, and so on. Polo [1991] shows that the game
under imperfect information has indeed no pure-strategy equilibrium in prices.23
To illustrate this for our framework, note ﬁrst that the usual Bertrand result
cannot be an equilibrium. One of the providers might increase its price by some
amount ε > 0 in order to increase its proﬁt: In particular, assume provider 1
increases its price p1 from p1 = p2 = 0 to e p1 = p2 +ε = ε. Of course, at p1 = p2
proﬁts are zero. At e p1 = ε, however, due to (3) we obtain
e Π1(e p1,p2,δ) = e p1 |{z}
>0
· δ





> 0 for t > ε > 0. (7)
Thus one of the two insurers could always increase its proﬁt by increasing its
price, meaning that fair insurance p1 = p2 = 0 could not be an equilibrium.
It seems intuitively clear that symmetric pricing p1 = p2 >> 0 cannot be an
equilibrium since a provider may slightly undercut its rival and gain all unin-
formed consumers without losing informed ones. We may illustrate equilibrium
23 See Polo [1991], p. 708.






























(p1 − 2p2 + t)

. (9)
The price reaction functions of the two insurers are then given by
p
R













































These reaction functions are represented graphically in Figure 1. As can easily
be seen from the ﬁgure, the reaction functions don’t intersect. There is no
equilibrium in pure strategies.
If some consumers are uninformed about their best product match, discontinu-
ities in the reaction functions imply that the game will have no pure-strategy
equilibrium. Thus any game structure leaving some consumers uninformed
about their optimal product match cannot lead to a market equilibrium in pure
24 Here 1[0, p2)(p1) etc. represent the indicator functions meaning 1A(y) which for every
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Figure 1: Failure of pure strategy equilibrium under δ ∈ (0,1).
strategies. Building upon a result by Dasgupta and Maskin [1986], it can be
shown that there is a symmetric equilibrium in mixed strategies.25
Real-world decisions of insurance providers concerning their prices seem, how-
ever, not randomly made. A stable pure-strategy equilibrium seems a more
convincing concept in order to oﬀer a plausible hypothesis on empirical market
behavior of ﬁrms in oligopolistic interaction. The unsatisfactory instability of
prices within a certain range (given mixed strategies) could be overcome when
intermediation is added to our analysis. We suggest this solution in the next
section.
25 Mixed strategy equilibria in Hotelling’s original model are examined by Dasgupta and
Maskin [1986] and Osborne and Pitchik [1987]. Osborne and Pitchik [1987] show that the
range of possible outcomes with mixed strategy equilibria may be large. Dasgupta and
Maskin [1986] demonstrate that under full information there may be inﬁnite equilibria in
mixed strategies. Introducing imperfect information, Polo analyzes the second stage of
Hotelling’s game. He considers a slightly diﬀerent setting than we do. For our framework
and results, it is suﬃcient to assume that the market is completely covered which means
that we assume t
−
j := 0 and t
+
j := 1 in Polo’s framework. See Polo [1991], pp. 703,708-
711. This assumption is standard and avoids the possibility of an issue discussed by Wang
and Yang [1999] which may be interpreted as follows. When risk aversion of consumers
reaches a suﬃciently low level, less than maximum diﬀerentiation might result in the
pure-strategy equilibrium since insurers might have an incentive to move towards the
middle of the market in order to capture consumers in the central area. Since our focus
is on the second stage of the original game, this problem is not interesting from our view
and we thus avoid it.
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Sequence of play with intermediation 
 
 


























Figure 2: Sequence of events with intermediation.
5 Insurance Market with Intermediation
As we have shown in the previous section, the existence of uninformed and thus
price-sensitive consumers plays an important role since those consumers pro-
voke a failure of market equilibrium. In this situation, it seems interesting and
reasonable to introduce an honest intermediary who improves the matching of
uninformed consumers and insurers in the market. We assume that an interme-
diary incurs some variable cost k > 0 of performing a risk analysis and reveals
the position of a consumer on the Hotelling-line perfectly.26 Thus a broker
transforms a previously uninformed consumer into an informed consumer.
Generally, there are two remuneration systems how the broker may be paid: the
broker might be paid directly by consumers (we refer to this system as ”fee”
or ”fee-for-advice” system) or the broker might be paid for his service by the
insurer (we refer to this system as ”commission” remuneration system). We
ﬁrst study the latter and then compare our results with the former system. The
sequence of play we consider is depicted in Figure 2.
5.1 Commissions
Under the commission remuneration system, the broker is paid by insurance
providers. Since information from a broker is costless for consumers at stage
three of the game, all uninformed consumers prefer to become informed by the
broker. The insurer has to pay the brokers’ fee m for each risk analysis. Given
the broker market is competitive, marginal cost pricing leads to the brokers’ fee
26 A risk analysis is usually expensive since it requires expertise not only in ﬁnance, but
also in actuarial science, law and engineering. See Cummins and Doherty [2006], p. 392.
13m = k.27 This leads us to
Proposition 1 Under commissions, there is a full-information market equilib-
rium in pure strategies. Equilibrium proﬁts of insurance providers are t/2.
Proof: Proﬁts of insurers are
Π
c
1 = (p1 − (1 − δ)k) · (






2 = (p2 − (1 − δ)k) · (1 −
p2 − p1 + t
2t
). (13)





p2 − 2p1 + t + (1 − δ)k
2t






p1 − 2p2 + t + (1 − δ)k
2t
! = 0. (15)































2 = t + (1 − δ)k (18)
27 In the US, for example, there is indeed intense competition in the intermediary market,
especially for small and medium-sized risks. Overall competitiveness tends to vary by
market segment. See Cummins and Doherty [2006], p. 369-370. An alternative interpre-
tation of marginal cost pricing might be that the participation constraint of the broker
must hold and implies that he participates if he is indiﬀerent between oﬀering his service
and not oﬀering. Therefore, the providers would like to pay him m = k. Without loss
of generality, we might suppose that when the broker is indiﬀerent between oﬀering his
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Figure 3: Nash equilibria in pure strategies under δ = 1 and δ = 0.










The equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 3 by the intersection point of price re-
action functions. As compared to the standard Bertrand-equilibrium premiums
pB
1 = pB
2 = 0, it is easy to see that equilibrium premiums are higher than fair.
By informing all uninformed consumers about product suitability via insur-
ance intermediaries, the commission system leads to a symmetric pure-strategy
full-information equilibrium. Insurers make positive proﬁts and share market
demand equally. Intermediation via the commission system is desirable for
both uninformed consumers and insurers because uninformed consumers are
optimally matched to product varieties and insurers earn higher proﬁts than
without intermediation.28 Interestingly, equilibrium proﬁts in (19) would be the
same in a Hotelling-market with full information and no intermediation which
suggests that costs of commissions are entirely allocated to policyholders via
insurance premiums. The key point of the commission system is therefore that
in equilibrium uninformed consumers are subsidized by informed ones.
28 This follows easily from the proof of proposition 2 in the next section.
155.2 Fees
While under the commission system, all uninformed consumers automatically
ask for information from an intermediary since it is costless for them, under
the fee system, consumers must pay the broker for his service before purchasing
insurance from one of the two providers. It seems realistic to assume that con-
sumers diﬀer in their individual willingness to pay for the brokers’ information
since they generally diﬀer in expected loss (loss size and/or probability of loss)
and thus being mismatched with the wrong provider matters diﬀerently. In par-
ticular, a mismatch matters more for ”high risk” consumer types than for ”low
risk” types. To describe consumer heterogeneity, we introduce a utility param-
eter θ ∈ [0,θ] with appropriate density function f(θ) and distribution function
F(θ).29 The broker market is again competitive and marginal cost pricing leads
to the brokers’ fee m = k. We conclude that uninformed consumers decide to ask
for information and become informed if the individual value of the information
from the broker exceeds the cost of providing it, i.e.30













t + θ ≥ k. (20)
Making the reasonable assumption that θ > k > 3
16t, consumers with θ ≥ b θ :=
k − 3
16t ask for product suitability analysis from the broker and consumers with
θ < b θ do not. Since b θ > 0but θ ∈ [0,θ] there always exist some consumers
who do not buy from the broker. Some consumers remain uninformed about
their best product match and no pure-strategy insurance market equilibrium
can result under the fee system.
Hence, only a part of previously uninformed consumers 1 − δ decide to become
informed by a broker. This leads to a new proportion of informed consumers
under the fee system to read
e δ = δ + (1 − δ)(1 − F(b θ)). (21)
29 While transport cost t represents disutility of mismatch resulting from not having an ideal
insurance product, θ measures the impact of this mismatch. Uninformed consumers are
indiﬀerent between insurance providers. However, they value the impact of mismatch
diﬀerently due to their diﬀerent underlying risks. A higher risk makes a claim more
likely which results in stronger manifestation of mismatch.
30 For an uninformed consumer, the mean distance to an insurance provider is 1/2. When
he is informed, his location is between 0 and 1/2 or 1/2 and 1. Thus the mean distance
for an informed consumer is 1/4.
16Proposition 2 Under a fee system, some consumers remain uninformed and
no pure-strategy equilibrium exists. The equilibrium is then in mixed strategies
and insurers’ expected proﬁts are lower than under commissions.
Proof: The ﬁrst part has already been shown. The equilibrium under fees is in
mixed strategies due to e δ ∈ (0,1). Polo [1991] shows that there is a symmetric
equilibrium in mixed strategies. Equilibrium prices are deﬁned over a ﬁnite
interval which lies below the full information price and shifts down as the mass
of uninformed consumers increases (i.e. δ decreases).31 Given the symmetry of
the problem, equilibrium expected proﬁts will be lower than under commissions.

5.3 Social Welfare
Let us now look at social welfare (or social cost) under both remuneration
systems. In order to compare both systems, social cost may be represented by
the sum of disutilities of mismatch over all consumers and the information cost
of the brokers. In a welfare optimum social cost is minimized. From a social
welfare viewpoint, the fee system seems superior since it induces only those
consumers to buy the brokers’ information for whom it is indeed worthwhile
to do so. Hence, the fee system leads to the social optimum: Social costs
are minimized. Under the commission system, in contrast, costs of becoming
informed are zero (at stage three of the game) so that all uninformed consumers
ask for information, even those for whom the value of information is smaller
than the cost of providing it. Hence, uninformed consumers are subsidized by
informed consumers. The commission system misses the social optimum. We
summarize this in
Proposition 3 Social welfare under fees is ﬁrst-best eﬃcient. Social welfare
under commissions leads to ’overinformation’ of consumers compared to the so-
cial optimum.
Proof: Under a commission system, all uninformed consumers ask for a risk
analysis. Social cost is then32
31 See Polo [1991], proposition 4, p. 708 and proposition 5, p. 711. Note that full informa-
tion prices in Hotelling’s model are smaller than in (18).








t + (1 − δ)k, (22)
where the proportion of previously uninformed consumers is given by 1 − δ.
Under a fee-for-advice system, we may write social cost to read33
S










t + (e δ − δ)k. (23)
Comparing (23) to (22), simple calculation reveals
S
c − S
f = (1 − e δ)(k −
3
16
t) > 0, (24)
i.e. social cost under commissions is higher than under fees. This implies that
social welfare is indeed higher under fees than under commissions. 
Summarizing our results, we may conclude that the fee system is socially optimal
but has no equilibrium in pure strategies while the commission system leads to
’overinformation’ of consumers relative to the social optimum, but is preferable
from the view of insurance providers due to the fact that it leads to a full-
information market equilibrium in pure strategies and higher expected proﬁts.
6 Concluding Remarks
The introduction of product diﬀerentiation and intermediation into insurance
demand broadens the range of possible market equilibria compared to the stan-
dard Bertrand models. In an insurance market exhibiting product diﬀerentiation
and coexistence of perfectly and imperfectly informed consumers, competition
among insurers may lead to discontinuities in the reaction functions so that a
(subgame perfect) pure-strategy equilibrium fails to exist. The introduction of
intermediation, however, may result in a symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium,
positive proﬁts of insurers and full information of consumers in the insurance
market. The rationale for the latter is that increasing market transparency via
intermediation increases product diﬀerentiation (since previously uninformed
33 Actually, it is not clear where insurance providers will locate in [0,1] since there is no
pure-strategy equilibrium in the price game. For comparison, however, we assume the
same locations.
18consumers become informed ones), and therefore leads to less tight competi-
tion. This mechanism ensures positive proﬁts of insurers and full information
of consumers in equilibrium. While higher transparency on the consumer side
is usually thought to promote competition, our framework where consumers be-
come informed about product match via intermediation suggests that increas-
ing consumers’ information makes the market less competitive and thus leads
to positive proﬁts. Insurance premiums are thus higher than actuarially fair in
competitive equilibrium.
Interestingly, our results are opposite to those obtained by Schultz [2004] and
Focht et al. [2006]. While these authors ﬁnd that, given prices and product
characteristics are unobservable by some consumers, increasing market trans-
parency on the consumer side implies less product diﬀerentiation, lower prices
and proﬁts, we show that – when prices are observable by consumers – increasing
market transparency (for example via intermediation) increases product diﬀer-
entiation (since previously uninformed consumers become informed ones), and
therefore leads to less intense competition associated with higher prices and
proﬁts. Uninformed consumers are price sensitive since the price is the only
criterion which actually matters to them. In the models by Schultz [2004] and
Focht et al. [2006], consumers act stochastically since they do not have any
information at all. This suggests that basic assumptions about the information
structure of the game seem to play an important role.
Our results also add to those obtained by Cummins and Doherty [2006] who
argue that in a perfectly competitive insurance market where insurers cannot
observe loss probabilities, brokers might prevent a market failure by inform-
ing insurers about loss probabilities of their customers. We show that (in an
oligopolistic insurance market) even if loss probabilities are perfectly observable,
a market failure might arise without intermediation due to lack of information
about product match. The market failure might be prevented by introducing
information intermediaries.
We explicitly model commissions versus fees. We ﬁnd that fees minimize social
cost but yield lower proﬁts for insurers and failure of an equilibrium in pure
strategies. Commissions imply that more consumers are informed than would
be socially optimal. In equilibrium uninformed consumers are subsidized by
informed ones. While the fee system appears to be unstable, the commission
system seems preferable from the viewpoint of insurance providers since it yields
both a stable full-information market equilibrium and higher expected proﬁts.
This might explain why intermediaries are generally compensated by insurance
19providers in practice. The superiority of the commission system over the fee
system from the insurers’ viewpoint has not been shown yet. Existing models
predict equivalence of both systems and thus cannot explain the prevalence of
commissions in practice.34 A further interesting result is that commissions are
passed on in the premiums, a phenomenon which can be empirically conﬁrmed
as well.35
Finally, our theoretical model abstracts from some aspects which might also
be important in insurance markets with intermediation. For instance, we ab-
stain from the brokers’ advice quality and their incentives to inform consumers
perfectly. While the fee system seems to oﬀer brokers a high incentive to in-
form consumers truthfully about their ’best matching product’, the commission
system might oﬀer lower incentives.36 However, even when we assume these in-
centive problems away, the commission system misses the social optimum. We
show that in a ’perfect world’ where all intermediaries act non-strategically and
honestly reveal the best product for their customers, the commission system –
which is inferior from a social welfare viewpoint – will be established in the
industry due to its capacity of being associated with higher expected proﬁts for
insurance providers in market equilibrium.
34 See Gravelle [1994] and Focht et al. [2006].
35 See Cummins and Doherty [2006], p. 381-383.
36 Sass and Gisser [1989], for instance, argue that turning a broker who acts under the
commission system into an exclusive agent (like one acting under the fee system for one
particular insurer) will induce the broker to use a higher eﬀort level for this particular
insurer than before. This is because the broker has no possibility to sell rival products
any more which lowers his opportunity cost.
20Appendix
Throughout our analysis, we have supposed ’locations’ 0 and 1 of insurers,
respectively. Our concern here is to verify these equilibrium locations resulting
from the game when there is a ’stage zero’, i.e. when providers can at an initial
zero-stage freely choose locations on the Hotelling line. Product characteristics
may be represented by a location qi of provider i on the unit line. Without loss of
generality, we assume that provider 1 is to the left of provider 2: 0 ≤ q1 ≤ q2 ≤ 1.
Of course, at q1 = q2, we have no product diﬀerentiation: Products are identical
and Bertrand competition yields the well-known Bertrand result. In our relevant
case where δ = 1, the structure of the game can be reduced as follows: In the ﬁrst
stage, ﬁrms choose their product characteristics, and then, in the second stage,
ﬁrms compete in prices. D’Aspremont et al. [1979] have shown that in case of
a two-stage game where ﬁrms choose a location at an initial stage, and then
compete in prices at the second stage, there will be ’maximum diﬀerentiation’,
i.e. the ﬁrms select locations as far apart from each other as possible. We show
that maximum diﬀerentiation also holds in our framework under the commission
system. Given some positive transportation cost t > 0, a consumer located at
x ∈ [0,1] faces disutility t(qi − x)2 from purchasing a product from ﬁrm i.
By choosing diﬀerent locations, however, ﬁrms can ensure themselves positive
proﬁts. A consumer purchases from provider 1 if his net utility is higher, so
r − p1 − t(x − q1)
2 ≥ r − p2 − t(q2 − x)
2 (25)










Market shares for providers 1 and 2 are then b x and 1 − b x, respectively. Proﬁts
of insurers are
































1(q1,q2) = (1 − δ)k + t∆q ·
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2(q1,q2) = (1 − δ)k + t∆q ·
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3
(2 − q). (33)
We can now establish reduced proﬁt functions by substituting equilibrium prices
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t(4 − q1 + q2)
2(q2 − q1). (35)











providers will optimally select locations as far apart from each other as possible.
Therefore, when providers are restricted to locate in [0,1], they will locate in
q∗
1 = 0 and q∗
2 = 1, respectively.
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